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one another. For example, is the scheme of antithesis reinforced by 
metaphors of confrontation or personification? Does the speaker 
portray abstract entities going "head to head"? Moreover, a critic 
might go beyond figures of speech to explore how the figures work 
within the overall structure and form of the text. Is a text, contain-
ing several antitheses and metaphors of confrontation, divided into 
two contrasting sections, sending and reaffirming the message that 
the truth is only one of two choices? There are many tools and 
techniques that a critic may use, including a growing body of social 
science study into how we use metaphor, other figures of speech and 
linguistic forms.JI These studies cannot replace a sensitive critic in 
arguing about the meaning of a piece of judicial rhetoric, but they 
provide additional material for the critic's argument. 
Bosmajian has made a sound contribution to the ongoing dis-
cussion about the role of language in legal discourse. His book does 
reveal several methodological problems with which all critics of 
legal discourse must contend. These problems provide additional 
opportunities for investigation and argument. They are not reasons 
for rejecting Bosmajian's central message: Law is language-based. 
As judges, academics, legislators, and lawyers--even tax lawyers-
we should watch our language. 
NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS. 
Edited by Robert P. George.I New York: Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 1992. Pp. 371. $39.95. 
Steven D. Smithz 
I 
A little over a decade ago, John Ely explained that natural law 
is, for purposes of constitutional adjudication at least, "uselessly 
vague." This defect is also, Ely suggested, the source of natural 
law's persistent appeal: "The advantage, one gathers, is that you can 
invoke natural law to support anything you want. The disadvan-
31. Although we still have a great deal to learn. See Calvin Morrill and Peter C. Facci-
ola, The Power of Language in Adjudication and Mediation: Institutional Contexts as 
Predictors of Social Evaluation, 17 Law & Social Inquiry 191 (1992); Richard D. Rieke and 
Randall K. Stutman, Communication in Legal Advocacy 210-11, 216-18 (U. of S. Carolina 
Press, 1990) (collecting research and applying it to closing arguments). 
I. Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Colorado. 
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tage is that everybody understands that."3 
At the time Ely wrote, natural law in the legal academy was 
little more than a slogan-a ghostly vestige of the full-blooded legal 
philosophy it once had been. In the same year, however, John Fin-
nis's Natural Law and Natural Rights gave new vigor to academic 
thinking on this subject. Today, as this volume attests, natural law 
refers to a body of scholarly work more serious, more developed 
and richer than it was when Ely wrote so dismissively. 
The volume offers an impressive array of essays by contempo-
rary natural law theorists and their critics. For those who may 
wonder what natural law is (beyond a slogan), the contributions by 
John Finnis and Michael Moore provide careful and lucid exposi-
tions. Neil MacCormick helpfully discusses the common ground 
between natural law and legal positivism, concluding that the tradi-
tional opposition between these views is now "closed and unfruit-
ful." Joseph Boyle and Russell Hittinger compare natural law with 
tradition- and virtue-oriented ethics, while Robert George explains 
how the supposed disagreement between "ontological" and "episte-
mological" versions of natural law is misconceived. Joseph Raz and 
Ernest Weil:trib engage in a spirited discussion of Weinrib's distinc-
tive views about the formal or "imminent" rationality oflaw. I can-
not mention here all of the essays in the volume, but it is fair to say 
that the essays are, without exception, thoughtful contributions to 
the understanding of natural law-even when the positions they 
take are (as, for example, either Raz's or Weinrib's must be) seri-
ously flawed. 
But these laudatory comments may still leave readers of a jour-
nal called Constitutional Commentary with professional questions. 
What does natural law scholarship have to contribute to constitu-
tional law? And have developments in natural law theory rendered 
Ely's dismissive observations obsolete? The state-of-the-art answers 
to these questions, I think, are "Not much" and "Probably not." I 
offer these answers tentatively, though, and with one major qualifi-
cation. There may be a way in which natural law is helpful-even 
necessary-to constitutional law. But natural law is not helpful, I 
think, in the way that contemporary constitutional lawyers have 
hoped it might be. 
II 
Perhaps the most familiar and attractive use for natural law in 
constitutional debates-and the use that Ely was criticizing-is in 
3. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 48-54 (Harv. U. Press, 1980). 
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justifying rights that have little or no basis in the constitutional text. 
Judges and scholars have agonized over the rationale, or lack 
thereof, for such judicial constructions as the right to abortion or 
the right to use contraceptives. A common criticism asserts that 
because these and similar rights are not grounded in the Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court was improperly "legislating" when it rec-
ognized them. To some, natural law has seemed to offer an answer 
to this criticism because it may suggest the existence of what 
Michael Moore describes as "pre-existing moral rights all persons 
possess." 
But can natural law plausibly be called into service in support 
of unenumerated constitutional rights? Two essays in this volume 
are especially relevant to the question. Jeremy Waldron asks 
whether natural law, or moral realism, can help deflect criticisms of 
judicial "arbitrariness"-that is, of unpredictability, irrationality 
and illegitimacy in judicial decisions. Waldron's negative response 
focuses on the prevalence of moral disagreement and on the absence 
of any procedure or methodology for resolving such disagreement. 
Although natural lawyers assert that there is an objective moral re-
ality and that moral statements are true or false by virtue of their 
agreement or disagreement with that reality, the sad fact is that 
"moral realists can produce no epistemology to match their onto-
logical commitments." Thus, "even if there are moral facts ... , still 
the best a judge can do is to impose her opinion about such facts on 
the 'hapless litigants' who come before her." 
Consequently, moral realism does nothing to reduce judicial 
arbitrariness in any sense. More specifically, Waldron argues that 
without a procedure for resolving moral disagreements, natural law 
does not enhance the predictability of judicial decisions. Nor does 
it make judicial decisions more rational, because judges "simply an-
nounce [their views] flatly, saying that though they cannot argue 
about virtue or vice, they know it when they see it." Most impor-
tantly, Waldron contends that moral realism does nothing to make 
judicial decisions more legitimate: 
[C]onsider again how little difference the recasting of the judges', 
legislators', and voters' moral views in realist terms would make. 
If realism is true then what the judge is imposing on her fellow 
citizens is not something which is merely a subjective preference 
of hers, but something which is a belief of hers about the moral 
facts. That looks reassuring until we remember that what the 
judge's view is opposed to is, equally, not the subjective prefer-
ences of legislators and voters, but their beliefs about the moral 
facts. As before, in the absence of any account of how one could 
tell which of two conflicting beliefs about the moral facts is more 
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accurate, the imposition of one person's or a few people's beliefs 
over those of the population at large still seems arbitrary and 
undemocratic. 4 
Michael Moore responds by arguing that moral disagreement 
does not negate the possibility of a moral reality; people disagree 
about lots of things that concededly exist. Moreover, if there is an 
objective moral reality, then at least "there is something (in the na-
ture of equality or of liberty) about which the judge could be right." 
For the anti-realist, by contrast, any justification of unenumerated 
rights is foreclosed from the start; the anti-realist's ontological as-
sumptions ensure that the judge who strikes down a law is merely 
imposing his preferences on a democratic majority. "The short of it 
is that the justification of judicial review is a wild and unseemly 
scramble for any but a moral realist." 
Moore's point seems correct as far as it goes. Still, if the argu-
ment ends here, then we are back to Ely: The proposition that there 
is a moral reality, or a natural law, is "uselessly vague" indeed if we 
have no way of determining whether a claimed but controversial 
right is part of that law. 
Perhaps this is where the argument does most plausibly end. 
One leading natural lawyer, John Finnis, concedes that for most 
practical issues there are many wrong answers and many right an-
swers. "Reason" cannot finally settle such issues, and we must in-
stead look to "authoritative" sources-that is, to the positive law. 
In short, natural law is of little help in resolving concrete and con-
troversial legal questions. Another essayist, Lloyd Weinreb, 
reaches a similar conclusion: "Natural law may not matter a great 
deal 'functionally'; it is not likely to affect how one's obligations are 
established, the weight one gives them, or the consequences of meet-
ing or failing to meet them." 
Moore is not oblivious to this problem. He recognizes that he 
must argue not only for the existence of a moral reality, but also for 
the greater capacity of judges (as opposed to legislators) to discern 
that reality; and he tries to sketch out the case for superior moral 
competence on the part of judges. Waldron, conversely, anticipates 
this tactic and tries to preempt it by suggesting that "[ w ]ithout an 
epistemology . . . there cannot be a theory of expertise." 
On this point, Waldron seems to have the edge. Judges might 
be especially good at discerning and following moral truth, but 
there are hardly compelling reasons to suppose so. The eagerness of 
many legal academics to indulge this dubious assumption may 
4. Pp. 180-81. 
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merely reflect the cultural affinity between judges and law profes-
sors; the assumption by academics can thus be seen as a kind of 
thinly veiled self-congratulation. ("Judges must be especially astute 
in moral matters. After all, they think a lot like we do.") And, of 
course, even if Moore could demonstrate that judges are better at 
discerning moral reality, it would not follow that they have author-
ity to impose their vision on society. The faculty of the Harvard 
Philosophy Department might be better moral reasoners than ordi-
nary citizens (a purely hypothetical supposition, of course), but 
even if they were, it would not follow that the U.S. Marshals ought 
henceforth to enforce the professors' prescriptions against the rest 
of us. 
In short, Moore's efforts notwithstanding, natural law theory 
still has not been made serviceable to shore up decisions like Gris-
wold and Roe. However, if one extends Moore's valid criticism of 
Waldron and of anti-realism, another possibility emerges. Perhaps 
natural law is necessary to shore up the authority of law in gen-
eral-and hence (insofar as it is not, as some suspect, an oxymoron) 
of constitutional law. 
III 
As noted, Moore argues that if an objective moral reality ex-
ists, then there is at least something about which judges could be 
right. Conversely, if there is no moral reality, the judge's decision 
cannot even claim to be more legitimate than that of a legislature; it 
is all just a matter of one subjective preference against another. 
This observation seems cogent, and it need not be limited to 
the problem of judges in conflict with legislators. What about the 
problems of legislative majorities in conflict with legislative minori-
ties, or of legislators (or other government officials) in conflict with 
dissenting citizens? Extending Moore's point just slightly, can we 
not say that if there is no moral reality, then legislative majorities 
cannot even claim that their decisions are more legitimate, or more 
"just," than the contrary desires or opinions of dissenters? How 
then can law (whether it comes from judges, legislators or bureau-
crats) ever claim any moral authority? Why should citizens have 
any "obligation" to respect or obey it? Lloyd Weinreb asks the ba-
sic question in its most general form: "In the absence of moral or-
der, why ought anything at all?" 
The question is underscored by an essay that seeks, in fact, to 
banish that question. Jeffrey Stout begins by noting the invocation 
of natural law in noble causes by figures as diverse as Sophocles, 
Thomas Jefferson and Martin Luther King, Jr. Stout likes this use 
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of natural law; he wants to preserve a place for it in political dis-
course. At the same time, he is troubled by natural law's "dubious 
metaphysical trappings." Stout notes that natural law would make 
sense on Thomistic assumptions, but of course . . . . So he quickly 
passes on to what he seems to regard as more viable alternatives-
that is, to potential nontheistic accounts of a higher moral law. But 
upon examination, all of these accounts prove unsatisfying, and 
even "demoralizing"; quoting Annette Baier, Stout observes that 
studying ethical theory can be "a very effective way to produce a 
moral skeptic." How then are we to preserve the efficacious uses of 
natural law rhetoric when we can give no plausible account of the 
moral reality that this rhetoric seems to presuppose? 
Stout's answer is that we should quit asking troublesome ques-
tions. More specifically, we should stop asking metaphysical ques-
tions about whether there is a moral reality: "[S]hun the quest. 
Avoid the bog. Stop the cycle. Give up the idea that truth must be 
a substantial something." Adopting this position, which Stout 
characterizes as neither realism nor anti-realism but rather as a 
"'silence is golden' policy," would cost us next to nothing: We 
would still have "descriptive anthropology" and "ordinary moral 
deliberation," and these are all we need. Indeed, Stout goes so far 
as to suggest that his question-proscribing silence would "restore 
moral discourse to respectability" and "restore one's confidence in 
moral truth." 
We are entitled, I think, to be skeptical. "Descriptive anthro-
pology" is fine for studying the moral beliefs and practices of a cul-
ture, but it does not presume to answer moral questions. "Ordinary 
moral deliberation" does address such questions-and perhaps 
more helpfully, as Stout suggests, than ethical theory does. But as 
scholars like Moore have argued elsewhere, ordinary moral dis-
course is not agnostic towards, but rather presupposes, moral real-
ity.s Hence, Stout's prescription threatens to poison the very 
practice that he wants to heal. 
The flaw in Stout's treatment, I think, is that it obscures and 
ignores the subtle but crucial difference between an innocent silence 
that results from taking something for granted and a contrived si-
lence imposed when what was previously taken for granted is called 
into question. Perhaps ordinary moral discourse is innocent and 
unself-conscious regarding its metaphysical assumptions. Such in-
5. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 277, 377-78 (1985). Waldron disputes this point, noting that many people affirm that 
morality is purely subjective, etc. The observation may be accurate, but it also elides the 
distinction between what people say about the nature of morality and what they say (and 
presuppose) when they are actually engaged in first-order moral discourse. 
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nocence may be conducive to moral discourse. Still, unself-con-
scious innocence is not the same as consciously self-imposed 
agnosticism. Nor can innocence, once lost, be regained simply by 
ruling bothersome questions out of bounds. 
Both the distinction that separates Stout's position from real 
moral deliberation and Stout's suppression of that distinction are 
reflected in his treatment of Edmund Burke. At the end of his es-
say, Stout invokes Burke in support of his "neither realist nor anti-
realist" position; indeed, he describes his recommendation of meta-
physical agnosticism as "the Burkean prescription." But Stout's 
own essay undermines this description. Earlier, he presents Burke 
in these terms: 
Burke used a concept of higher law. He believed that such a law 
exists and that its author is divine. Yet he wanted no part of the 
associated ethical theories. The example of Burke shows that 
you can believe in something, and be willing to use the concepts 
that refer to it when the time seems right, without holding that 
theorizing about its structure and content is an essential or desir-
able activity.6 
In Stout's presentation, in short, Burke begins as a believing 
metaphysical realist who is skeptical about the efficacy of theory; he 
ends up as a mere skeptic-but one who nonetheless thinks he can 
go on just as before. The latter Burke is a pitiable figure. He is like 
the erstwhile religious believer who thinks that she can enjoy all the 
advantages of her former faith while refusing to take a position on 
whether there is a God. 
The first Burke, by contrast, is a more promising character; he 
is also a personification, perhaps, of the way in which natural law 
may be relevant to law generally. It may be, as both its critics and 
some of its supporters argue, that natural law theory provides scant 
help in answering concrete questions, whether moral or legal. 
Other practices-the invocation of tradition, or the appeal to moral 
or legal "authorities," or "ordinary deliberation"-may be more 
helpful on that level. But these other practices rest upon assump-
tions that, although not usually examined or even acknowledged, 
are nonetheless essential; without them, such practices would lose 
their meaning. One such assumption is that there is a moral reality. 
And natural law theory may provide valuable support for and illu-
mination of that assumption. 
In sum, natural law remains "uselessly vague," as Ely said, if 
one is trying to answer specific constitutional questions. At the 
6. P. 83 (emphasis added). 
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same time, natural law may be a necessary (if typically unnoticed) 
premise for the possibility of any law, including constitutional law, 
that claims to exert moral authority. 
MONEY, POLmCS AND LAW: A STUDY OF ELECTO-
RAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN CANADA. By 
K.D. Ewing.t New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press/Clarendon Press. 1992. Pp. xvii, 254. Cloth, $59.00. 
Frank J. Sorauf2 
There are three nouns in Ewing's title, but only two of them 
merit the mention. His book is indeed about money and law. It is a 
traditional, legal-historical analysis of Canadian attempts to legis-
late about the funding of its political parties. But there is not much 
of Canadian politics in it, even the politics of reforming Canadian 
campaign finance. 
After some stage-setting, the author launches early into a de-
tailed history of attempts, both failed and successful, to legislate on 
campaign finance. The history culminates in a full chapter on the 
Election Expenses Act of 1974, the major definition of today's sta-
tus quo in Canadian law. All this legal history consumes a quarter 
of the book's pages. There then follows an extensive review of the 
finances of the Progressive Conservative, Liberal and New Demo-
cratic parties, employing only data through 1984. (On the vintage 
of the data, more later.) 
What may seem a random stroll through Canadian party fi-
nance does, however, have a purpose. Professor Ewing makes it 
very clear early on that this is to be an evaluation as well as a his-
tory. His highest desideratum for the regulation of campaign fi-
nance is equality of financial resources-complete equality. It is a 
standard that only systems of total public funding have a chance of 
meeting, and Canada's, with only partial public funding, inevitably 
fails. Not even the astounding and virtual equality of the parties' 
expenditures in the 1988 elections (PC, $7.9 million; L, $6.8 mil-
lion; NDP, $7.1 million) satisfies Ewing. The three parties, he 
points out, had greater disparities in the sums they spent outside of 
the campaign. 
The source of the problem is clear and simple. Canada has, 
I. Professor of Public Law, King's College, London. 
2. Regents' Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. 
